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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
  
Alesha Ann Green appeals from the Judgment dismissing her Amended Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief.  On appeal, Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it 
addressed the potential conflict of interest in her case, because it did not adequately 
inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of 
prejudice.  Ms. Green’s trial counsel in the underlying criminal case and her post-
conviction counsel worked for the same public defender’s office, and Ms. Green’s post-
conviction petition raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against trial counsel.  
The district court recognized there was a potential conflict of interest, but it did not 
adequately inquire into whether the circumstances of Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a 
significant likelihood of prejudice. 
   
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In Ada County No. CR 2012-6591, Ms. Green was convicted by a jury of two 
counts of felony trafficking in methamphetamine.  (See R., p.29.)   At the trial, an 
attorney from the Ada County Public Defender’s Office represented Ms. Green.  (See 
R., p.49.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with five years 
fixed, on the first count, and a concurrent unified sentence of twelve years, with three 
years fixed, on the second count.  (R., p.29.)  At the sentencing hearing, another 
attorney from the Ada County Public Defender’s Office represented Ms. Green.  (See 
R., pp.154-55 (sentencing hearing transcript).)  Ms. Green appealed, and the Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed her sentence in an unpublished opinion.  State v. Green, No. 
42452, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 506 (Idaho Ct. App. May 28, 2015). 
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Ms. Green filed, pro se, a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief.  
(R., pp.4-8.)  The petition raised the following grounds for relief:  “(a) Ineffective 
[counsel]”; “(b) Mishandling of evidence.  Lack of evidence”; and “(c) Untrue testimony 
of detectives.”  (R., p.5.)  Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
Ms. Green asserted her trial counsel failed to get any of her witnesses on her behalf, did 
not show up for the sentencing hearing, failed to thoroughly research and present 
evidence that could have helped her prove her innocence, and did not properly 
interrogate witnesses, i.e., on mishandling of evidence and perjured testimony of 
witnesses.  (R., p.6.) 
Ms. Green also filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of 
Counsel.  (R., pp.17-20.)  The district court granted the motion and appointed the Ada 
County Public Defender to represent Ms. Green in the post-conviction proceeding.  
(R., pp.21-22.)   The order granting the motion for appointment of counsel stated that 
“[b]ecause the petition for post-conviction relief . . . includes an allegation of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, the Ada County Public Defender may choose to appoint 
conflict counsel.”  (R., p.21.) 
A third attorney from the Ada County Public Defender was assigned to 
Ms. Green’s case as post-conviction counsel.  (See R., p.23.)  The district court then set 
a status conference.  (R., pp.25-26.)  The district court’s order setting the status 
conference noted “[a]s of the date of this order, no notice of appearance has been 
entered by conflict counsel for petitioner.”  (R., p.25.) 
At the status conference, the following exchange occurred between the district 
court and post-conviction counsel: 
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[THE COURT:]  And, [post-conviction counsel], are you appearing on 
behalf of petitioner? 
 
[POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:]  I am, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  So you have not actually sent that out for conflict 
counsel?  And I assume that’s because you were not the trial attorney. 
 
[POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:]  That’s what my boss tells me, Your 
Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  All right.   
 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.6-15.) 
 
The district court later inquired at the status conference: 
 
[THE COURT:]  [Post-conviction counsel], have you discussed with 
Ms. Green that you, as a member of the Ada County Public Defender’s 
Office, are representing her in this action? 
 
[POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:]  I have, Your Honor.  I had [a] chance 
to visit her last week.   
 
(Tr., p.8, Ls.17-22.)  Post-conviction counsel then discussed his review of the case so 
far and how much additional time he would need to prepare an amended post-
conviction petition.  (See Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.24.)  The district court gave post-
conviction counsel seven weeks to file an amended petition.  (Tr., p.9, L.25 – p.10, 
L.11.) 
Ms. Green, through post-conviction counsel, then filed an Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief.  (R., pp.29-32.)  The amended petition raised the following 
grounds for relief: “(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel”; “(b) Mishandling of evidence 
and lack thereof”; “(c) Untrue testimony of detectives”; and “(d) Failure to convey plea 
deal from State.”  (R., p.30.)  Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
Ms. Green asserted counsel failed to get any of her witnesses on her behalf, did not 
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show up for the sentencing hearing, failed to thoroughly research and present evidence 
that could have helped her prove her innocence, did not properly interrogate witnesses, 
i.e., on mishandling of evidence and perjured testimony of witnesses, and failed to fully 
explain the new offer from the State.  (R., p.30.) 
The State filed an Answer to the amended petition.  (R., pp.35-36.)  The State 
also filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and Exhibits, arguing the amended petition 
raised no genuine issue of material fact.  (R., pp.37-38.)   As an exhibit, the State 
attached the transcript of Ms. Green’s jury trial and sentencing hearing.  (R., pp.39-162 
(State’s Ex. 1).)   
In its Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition, the State argued 
Ms. Green’s claims were bare and conclusory.  (R., pp.163-70.)  On the claim that 
Ms. Green’s trial counsel was ineffective for not appearing at her sentencing hearing, 
the State argued Ms. Green did not articulate specifically why the second attorney who 
appeared at the hearing performed deficiently, the record contradicted her claim of 
prejudice because Ms. Green indicated at the hearing she was comfortable with going 
forward with the second attorney, and the Idaho Court of Appeals had affirmed her 
sentences.  (R., pp.166-67.)  Regarding the claim that Ms. Green’s counsel was 
ineffective for failing to get any witnesses or evidence contrary to the State’s charges, 
the State contended Ms. Green did not identify what evidence or which witnesses 
counsel failed to present, did not articulate how or why the evidence or testimony would 
have affected the outcome of her trial, and did not provide the district court with a copy 
of the security footage or show any resulting prejudice from the failure to present the 
footage.  (R., pp.167-68.) 
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On the claim that Ms. Green’s counsel was ineffective for not properly 
interrogating witnesses, the State argued Ms. Green did not identify which witnesses 
were not questioned properly or what questions counsel should have asked, and she 
did not articulate how or why the evidence or testimony would have affected the 
outcome of her trial.  (R., p.168.)  With respect to the claim that Ms. Green’s counsel 
was ineffective for failing to fully explain a new plea offer from the State, the State 
argued Ms. Green did not identify what new offer was not fully explained, and she did 
not articulate how or why the failure to explain the new offer would have affected the 
outcome of her trial.  (R., p.169.)  Thus, the State requested the district court grant its 
motion for summary disposition.  (R., p.169.) 
The district court subsequently issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss.  (R., pp.173-
75.)  In the notice, the district court gave notice of “its intent to dismiss the . . . amended 
petition for post-conviction relief for the reasons set forth in Respondent’s . . . motion for 
summary disposition.”  (R., p.173.)  The district court granted Ms. Green twenty days to 
reply to the proposed dismissal of the post-conviction action.  (R., p.174.)  However, 
Ms. Green did not file a reply.  (See R., pp.2-3 (register of actions).)  The district court 
then issued a Judgment dismissing the amended petition.  (R., pp.176-77.) 
Ms. Green filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment.  
(R., pp.178-80.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it addressed the potential conflict of interest in 
Ms. Green’s case, because it did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances 
demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Addressed The Potential Conflict Of Interest In 
Ms. Green’s Case, Because It Did Not Adequately Inquire Into Whether The 
Circumstances Demonstrated A Significant Likelihood Of Prejudice   
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict 
of interest in her case, because it did not adequately inquire into whether the 
circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.  The district court 
recognized there was a potential conflict of interest because Ms. Green’s trial counsel 
and post-conviction counsel both worked for the same office and Ms. Green’s petition 
raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against trial counsel.  However, the 
district court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a 
significant likelihood of prejudice, because it did not ask post-conviction counsel 
questions such as whether his office had set up effective measures to prevent 
communication of confidential client information between lawyers employed on behalf of 
individual defendants. 
 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
If a post-conviction petitioner is unable to pay court costs and expenses of 
representation, “these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may be 
made available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court . . . 
and paid, on order of the district court.”  I.C. § 19-4904.  The Idaho Supreme Court has 
held “[t]he decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the 
discretion of the district court.”  Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004).  At 
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least in the context of criminal cases, the appointment of substitute counsel (on grounds 
of, for example, a conflict of interest) is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1  
See State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715 (2002). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held there is no constitutional or statutory right to 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings.  Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 394-95 
(2014).  However, the Idaho Court of Appeals before Murphy held that, while a post-
conviction petitioner did not have a constitutionally protected right to counsel, the 
petitioner “had an interest in securing assistance to adequately present his claims.”  See 
Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussing this interest in the 
context of procedural due process).    
 
C. The District Court Did Not Adequately Inquire Into Whether The Circumstances 
Of Ms. Green’s Case Demonstrated A Significant Likelihood Of Prejudice 
 
Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict 
of interest in her case, because the district court did not adequately inquire into whether 
the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.   
Ms. Green submits her interest in securing assistance to adequately present her 
post-conviction claims extends to an interest in having conflict-free post-conviction 
counsel.  Under the statutory standard for the appointment of post-conviction counsel, if 
a petitioner alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court 
                                            
1 When a district court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:  (1) whether the district court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted with the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason.  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
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should appoint counsel to give the petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and 
“properly allege the necessary supporting facts.”  See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.  
The opportunity for the petitioner to work with post-conviction counsel and properly 
allege the necessary supporting facts for the petitioner’s possibly-valid claims would be 
negated if counsel had a conflict of interest limiting counsel’s ability to represent the 
petitioner. 
The right to conflict-free counsel in criminal cases “derives from the Sixth 
Amendment as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  See State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003).  “Whenever a trial court 
knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has 
a duty of inquiry.”  Id. (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1981); Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)).  Ms. Green does not assert the constitutional right 
to conflict-free counsel in criminal cases applies to post-conviction proceedings such as 
the instant case. But by analogy to the constitutional standard, and to preserve the 
petitioner’s opportunity to work with post-conviction counsel, see Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793, a district court should inquire into potential conflicts of interest in post-
conviction matters. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held “[t]o determine whether an actual conflict of 
interest exists, Idaho Courts look to the standards set forth in the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 705 (2009).  The Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct provide that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a).  
A concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the representation 
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of one or more client will be materially limited . . . by the personal interests of the lawyer 
. . . .”  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2).  The comments for Rule 1.7 state “[t]he lawyer’s 
own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a 
client.  For example, if the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in 
serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached 
advice.”  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt. 10. 
Generally, under Rule 1.10, a lawyer’s concurrent conflicts of interest are 
imputed to his or her entire firm.  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a).  As an exception to 
the general rule, if the conflict is based on the lawyer’s personal interest, the conflict will 
be imputed to the lawyer’s entire firm if it “present[s] a significant risk of materially 
limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.”  See Idaho 
R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a)(1).   
Additionally, Idaho’s appellate courts have held there is no per se rule imputing 
one public defender’s conflict of interest to the public defender’s entire office.  Severson, 
147 Idaho at 706; State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 794 (Ct. App. 2007).  Rather, the 
preferred approach is “to analyze whether one public defender’s conflict should be 
imputed to the entire office on a case-by-case basis.”  Severson, 147 Idaho at 706 
(citing Cook, 144 Idaho at 794).  The relevant inquiry is “whether the circumstances 
demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).  “If so, there is a presumption 
that both an actual conflict of interest and actual prejudice will arise.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
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Here, the district court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances 
of Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.  The district court 
recognized there was a potential conflict of interest.  Ms. Green’s trial counsel and post-
conviction counsel both worked for the Ada County Public Defender’s Office.  (See, e.g., 
R., pp.23, 49.)  Ms. Green’s post-conviction petition raised ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims against trial counsel.  (R., pp.5-6.)  Thus, the district court’s order 
granting the motion for appointment of counsel provided that “[b]ecause the petition for 
post-conviction relief . . . includes an allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
the Ada County Public Defender may choose to appoint conflict counsel.”  (R., p.21.)  
The district further acknowledged the existence of a potential conflict by mentioning 
conflict counsel in the order setting the status conference.  (See R., p.25.) 
But even though it recognized the potential conflict, the district court did not 
adequately inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood 
of prejudice.  At the status conference, the district court simply asked post-conviction 
counsel: “So you have not actually sent that out for conflict counsel?  And I assume 
that’s because you were not the trial attorney.”  (Tr., p.6, Ls.9-12.)  The district court 
then accepted post-conviction counsel’s answer: “That’s what my boss tells me, Your 
Honor.”  (See Tr., p.6, Ls.13-15.)  The only other question on the potential conflict came 
when the district court asked post-conviction counsel if he had discussed with 
Ms. Green that he was representing her while working for the Ada County Public 
Defender’s Office, and post-conviction counsel answered in the affirmative.  (See 
Tr., p.8, Ls.17-22.)   
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Thus, the district court conducted nothing more than a superficial inquiry into 
whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.  For 
example, the district court did not inquire into “whether [the] office has set up effective 
measures to prevent communication of confidential client information between lawyers 
employed on behalf of individual defendants.”  See Severson, 147 Idaho at 707 (quoting 
Cook, 144 Idaho at 794 n.8) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Without asking such 
deeper questions that would allow the district court to take the individual situations of 
Ms. Green and her counsel into consideration, see Cook, 144 Idaho at 794, the district 
court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a 
significant likelihood of prejudice.   
The district court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances of 
Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.  Because the 
district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict of interest, the judgment 
dismissing Ms. Green’s amended post-conviction petition should be vacated and the 
matter should be remanded to the district court for a proper conflict determination.  If the 
district court determines there is a conflict of interest imputed to post-conviction counsel, 
Ms. Green should receive conflict-free counsel to preserve her opportunity to work with 
counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts for her post-conviction 
claims.  See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.   
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CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Ms. Green respectfully requests this Court vacate the 
judgment dismissing her amended post-conviction petition and remand her case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 11th day of March, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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